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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Larry Lee James Stadtmiller was charged with one count of felony sexual abuse 
of a minor child under sixteen years of age. Pursuant to an oral plea agreement, 
Mr. Stadtmiller attempted to enter a guilty plea to an amended charge of felony injury to 
a child, but the district court rejected that first attempted Alford plea. 1 He then 
attempted again to plead guilty to the amended charge as part of a written plea 
agreement, but the district court again refused to accept his Alford plea. At the 
conclusion of Mr. Stadtmiller's subsequent jury trial, the jury found him guilty of the 
original charge of sexual abuse of a minor child. The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of nine years, with three years fixed. 
Mr. Stadtmiller appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it rejected his first attempted Alford plea, and when it imposed his sentence. 
(App. Br., pp.6-18.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that, although Mr. Stadtmiller's denial 
of guilt did not legally preclude his Alford plea, the error is harmless because the record 
shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that without it, the district court would have 
exercised its discretion by rejecting his Alford plea. (Resp. Br., pp.5-13.) The State 
also argued that Mr. Stadtmiller did not establish that his sentence is excessive. (Resp. 
Br., pp.13-18.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's harmless error argument. 
Contrary to the State's contention, the district court's error in not acting consistently with 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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the legal standards applicable to accepting an Alford plea when it rejected 
Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court's error in not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not 
contribute to the district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. Thus, the 
district court committed reversible error, and Mr. Stadtmiller's judgment of conviction 
should be vacated and his case should be remanded for the district court to reconsider 
his Alford plea. 
While Mr. Stadtmiller also challenges the State's argument that he did not 
establish that his sentence is excessive, he relies on the arguments presented in the 
Appellant's Brief and will not repeat those arguments herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Stadtmiller's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first 
attempted Alford plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's First 
Attempted Alford Plea 
Mr. Stadtmiller asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected 
his first attempted Alford plea, because the district court did not act consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the decision of whether to accept an Alford plea. (App. 
Br., pp.6-14.) "[A]s long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the 
defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty may be 
accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is innocent." 
Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 61 (1981) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25). Further, "there is 
a substantial body of Idaho case law demonstrating that Alford pleas may rightfully be 
accepted in situations where the defendant asserts factual innocence." Schoger v. 
State, 148 Idaho 622, 629 n.4 (2010). The district court, by determining that it 
categorically could not accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any 
guilt or was not too intoxicated to remember the incident at issue, did not act 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to accepting an Alford plea. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State appears to agree that the district court did 
not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. "The district court's comments 
that, in order to qualify as an Alford plea, [Mr.] Stadtmiller had to either admit his 
criminal act ... or assert he could not recall his criminal conduct, [are] inconsistent with 
the standard set forth in Schoger." (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The State also writes, "In light 
of the district court's various statements that it did not have discretion to accept 
[Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea unless he either admitted guilt or claimed he could not 
4 
recall the criminal incident, the court appears to have employed an incorrect standard of 
law." (Resp. Br., p.8.) 
However, the State also argues that, "Because the record shows that, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the district court would have rejected [Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea 
under the correct legal standard, the error was harmless." (Resp. Br., p.8.) According 
to the State, the district court rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's second plea agreement 
"because he continued to deny his criminal conduct and, accordingly, would not be able 
to comply with the counseling requirements of probation." (Resp. Br., pp.9-10 (footnote 
omitted).) "By the same token," the oral plea agreement accompanying the first 
attempted Alford plea "required both parties to recommend probation and counseling 
(as recommended by the psychosexual evaluator), and it appears that probation and 
counseling were considered certainties." (Resp. Br., p.10.) Thus, the State argues that, 
"Even if the court had recognized it had discretion to accept [Mr.] Stadtmiller's [first] 
Alford plea without an admission of guilt, it would have rejected such a plea based on its 
general discretionary decision to not accept pleas of guilt unless the defendant actually 
admits guilt and can succeed on probation."2 (Resp. Br., p.10.) Contrary to the State's 
argument, the district court's error in not acting consistently with the legal standards 
2 Mr. Stadtmiller would again note that the applicable legal standards do not require a 
district court to accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt. 
(See App. Br., p.13 n.3.) In Schoger, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "no provision 
of Idaho law ... requires a court to accept a guilty plea." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630. 
Schoger is distinguishable from the present case because the district court in Schoger 
determined that it would not accept the defendant's Alford plea after applying the 
applicable legal standards to the particular circumstances in that case, see id. at 628-
30, while the district court here determined that it categorically could not accept 
Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford plea. 
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applicable to accepting an Alford plea when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted 
Alford plea is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "In Idaho, the harmless error test 
established in [Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967)] is now applied to all 
objected-to-error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Pursuant to Chapman, 
once a defendant establishes that an objected-to error occurred, "the State shall have 
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
at 222. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that "[tJo meet that burden," in the 
context of a case involving the question of whether the improper admission of evidence 
during a jury trial was harmless error, "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Joy, 155 
Idaho 1, __ , 304 P.3d 276, 286 (2013). "To say that an error did not 'contribute' to 
the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that 
feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous." Id., 304 P.3d at 286 (quoting 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 )). "To say that an error did not contribute to the 
verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury 
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Id., 304 P.3d at 286 
(quoting Yates, 500 U.S. at 403). 'Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not whether, in 
a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, 
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error." Id., 304 P.3d at 286 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 
(1993)) (emphasis in original). 
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Mr. Stadtmiller submits that, because the harmless error test established in 
Chapman applies to all objected-to-error in Idaho, Perry, 150 Idaho at 211, the State in 
this case should be held to the same burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error is harmless as to which it was held in Joy. Thus, the State must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the district court's 
rejection of Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ , 
304 P.3d at 286. 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Stadtmiller would note that the State has 
misapprehended the Chapman harmless error test. The State argues that, "Because 
the record shows that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court would have 
rejected [Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea under the correct legal standard, the error was 
harmless." (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have already rejected such a construction of the Chapman harmless 
error test. As the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Joy, the standard here is not 
whether, in a proceeding that occurred without the error, a rejection of the first 
attempted Alford plea "would surely have been rendered." See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ , 
304 P.3d at 286 (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The actual standard is whether the rejection of the first attempted Alford plea actually 
rendered in this case "was surely unattributable to the error." See id., 304 P.3d at 286 
(quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under the correct standard from the Chapman harmless error test, the State has 
not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in 
not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not contribute to the 
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district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. The State's harmless error 
argument relies upon the district court's later refusal of the written plea agreement. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) However, the district court's subsequent refusal of the written 
plea agreement does not establish that the district court would have rejected the earlier 
first attempted Alford plea without the error, because the district court refused the 
written plea agreement using the same incorrect legal standard that it used when it 
rejected the first attempted Alford plea. As its first reason for refusing the written plea 
agreement, the district court stated, "I can't accept a plea if a person doesn't think they 
did something criminal." (Tr., p.37, Ls.2-9.) Much like the district court's comments 
about why it rejected the first attempted Alford plea (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-24), this remark 
reflects that, in the words of the State, the district court was still operating under a 
standard "inconsistent with the standard set forth in Schoger." (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) 
Although the district court stated that its second reason for refusing the written 
plea agreement was that probation was not viable because Mr. Stadtmiller had not 
admitted to any wrongdoing as would be required to start or complete counseling 
(Tr., p.37, L.17 - p.38, L.2), this does not prove that the error complained of here is 
harmless. As discussed above, the district court's first reason shows that the district 
court, when it refused the written plea agreement, was still operating under the incorrect 
legal standard that it categorically could not accept Mr. Stadtmiller's plea because he 
did not admit any guilt. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.2-19.) Further, when the district court 
mentioned its second reason for refusing the written plea agreement, it did so only after 
mentioning its first reason. (See Tr., p.37, L.2 - p.38, L.2.) Rather than being the 
district court's sole rationale, the second reason merely worked in tandem with the first 
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reason-the incorrect legal standard-when the district court refused the written plea 
agreement. Put otherwise, the incorrect legal standard contributed to the district court's 
refusal of the written plea agreement. See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ , 304 P .2d at 286. 
Because the State's harmless error argument relies upon the district court's later 
refusal of the written plea agreement (see Resp. Br., pp.9-10), and because the 
incorrect legal standard contributed to the district court's refusal of the written plea 
agreement, the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's 
error did not contribute to the rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. See Joy, 155 
Idaho at __ , 304 P.2d at 286. It cannot be said that the rejection of the first attempted 
Alford plea was "surely unattributable to the error." See id., 304 P.2d at 286-87. Thus, 
the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court's error in not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not 
contribute to the district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. 
The district court abused its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first 
attempted plea agreement, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal 
standard. The State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the district court's error is harmless. The district court's error is reversible, and 
Mr. Stadtmiller's judgment of conviction should be vacated and his case should be 
remanded for the district court to reconsider his Alford plea. 
Alternatively, as the State argues in the event that this Court concludes the error 
is reversible (Resp. Br., pp.11-13), Mr. Stadtmiller's case should be remanded to the 
district court for a determination, using its discretion, of whether to accept 
Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford plea. See Lafler v. Cooper, _ U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
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1391 (2012); United States v. Rashad, 396 F.3d 398, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In this 
alternative scenario, this Court would not vacate the judgment of conviction before 
remanding Mr. Stadtmiller's case, and the district court on remand would determine 
whether to vacate the conviction and accept the plea, or leave the conviction and 
sentence in place. See Lafler, U.S. at __ , 132 S. Ct. at 1389. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Lafler, the proper remedy in this type of situation "may 
be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal . . . . [T]he judge can then 
exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the 
plea or leave the conviction undisturbed." See id., 132 S. Ct. at 1389. Mr. Stadtmiller 
would emphasize that, if the district court accepted the Alford plea on remand in this 
alternative scenario, it would have discretion to resentence Mr. Stadtmiller based on the 
plea and not on the conviction at trial. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 1389. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand his case for the district court to reconsider his Alford plea, or, 
alternatively, that this Court remand his case for the district court to determine, using its 
discretion, whether to accept his Alford plea. Alternatively, Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand his 
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2013. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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